

Resistance and Collaboration in 'France Anglaise'
in the Last Stage of the Hundred Years War

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Preface

Just as some historians did after France was defeated by Germany in 1870 and 1940,¹ it would be certainly anachronistic, forgetting the historical common sense that nationalism was a modern concept, to project such an ideology onto medieval situation. However, it would also be quite prejudicial to rely on modern definitions of nation and nationalism, and simply assert that medieval people had no sense of national sentiment, identity, and patriotism.² After all, didn't Marc Bloch once say that the second feudal age not only “witnessed the formation of states” but also “saw true fatherlands confirmed or established”?³

Even though not necessarily the twelfth and thirteenth century that Bloch mentioned, the Hundred Years War might be an appropriate period to discuss the issues of national sentiment, identity, and patriotism. As Bernard Guenée pointed out, the war was, from the beginning, a “national war”, and since the early fourteenth century “the French began to speak of the French nation.”⁴ The prolonged war germinated the seeds of national sentiment, and served to breed political discourse and propaganda regarding the issue. In the words of Christopher Allmand, “the sustaining of public involvement was rapidly becoming part of the growing art of the management of war.”⁵ Many patriotic literature

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1 Notable examples are G. Guibal, *Histoire du sentiment national en France pendant la Guerre de Cent Ans*(Paris, 1871); M.-M. Martin, *Histoire de l'unité française*(Paris, 1949) and etc.

2 For a variety of theoretical discussions on this theme, see C. L. Tipton ed., *Nationalism in the Middle Ages*(New York, 1972).

3 Marc Bloch, *Feudal Society*; trans. L. A. Manyon(London, 1961), p. 437.

4 B. Guenée, “Etat et nation en France au Moyen Age”, *Politique et Histoire au Moyen Age*(Paris, 1981), pp. 161-162.

5 C. T. Allmand, *The Hundred Years War: England and France at War, c.1300-c.1450*(Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989), p. 137. See also, P. Contamine, “Mourir pour la Patrie: Xe-XXe siècle”, éd. P. Nora, *Les*

inspired national sentiment, as well as prejudice and hostility against the English. The idea of nation held an essential part in the political writings of numerous contemporary intellectual elite.

It is interesting and important, and at the same time quite difficult to figure out to what extent the political convictions and propaganda of the intellectual elite penetrated into the people's mind. It is impossible to reveal the feelings and sentiments of people based on quantitative evidence, and many documents tend to reflect the feelings and sentiments of the author rather than the people they describe. The issues of resistance and collaboration that appeared in France under the rule of England, the so-called 'France anglaise', provide a window through which one can gain insight into the feelings and sentiments of the French at that time. This article mainly discusses the period from the onset of the English invasion of Northeast France in 1417 to the treaty of Arras in 1435 that ended the hostilities between the Armagnacs and the Burgundians. A summary of the French politics around those years is as follows.

Chaos and conflict within the Kingdom was aggravated by a series of events including the battle of Agincourt in 1415 and the subsequent English occupation of Northeast France, the treaty of Troyes in 1420 that sought to unify the thrones of the two Kingdoms, and the civil war between the Armagnacs and the Burgundians caused by the assassination of Jean sans Peur, duke of Burgundy, in Montereau by the Dauphin's companions in 1419. The English occupation and the civil war essentially resulted in 'three Frances' divided into two opposite sides: The 'France anglaise', ruled by the Lancastrians, the 'Burgundian France' ruled by Philippe le Bon, duke of Burgundy and ally of the Lancastrians, and the 'Armagnac France' in the south of the Loire. The last part consisted of the royal domain of the dauphin Charles and the fiefs of princes siding with his court such as Duke of Orléans and his father-in-law, Count of Armagnac, Duke of Anjou, Duke of Bourbon, Count of Provence, and so on.

lieux de Mémoire: Nation(III), pp. 11-43; D. Kirkland, "The Growth of National Sentiment in France before the Fifteenth Century", *Histroy*, vol. 23(1938), pp. 12-24; Yong-Jin Hong, 「중세 말 프랑스 왕정과 '국가' 이데올로기: 필립 4세(1285-1314)와 샤를 5세(1364-1380) 시기를 중심으로」, 『사총』 62.

II. 'Resistant' France?

Episodes of the French resistance to the English invasion appeared intermittently from the early stages of the war on. In July of 1346, immediately after having landed at St.-Vaast-La-Hogue in Normandy, the forces of Edward III targeted the rich town Caen. But "they met with stout resistance on the part of the townspeople, and of the constable and the chamberlain, and many other nobles with them." After "the fighting took place in the center of the town", it was taken, plundered and burned, and many of whose inhabitants were taken as captives.⁶ Also, there has been a well-known story of how the people of Calais resisted the siege of the English from September of 1346, right after a great victory in the battle of Crécy, for almost a year "in fact, eating their horses, and even mice and rats" before they surrendered.⁷ Another famous story took place in 1359, immediately after the Jacquerie. Guillaume l'Aloue was chosen as the leader of the peasants who took over an abandoned fortress and resisted the English in a small town of Longueil in Beauvais. Grandferré, a giant warrior under his leadership, died heroically after defeating 60 to 80 Englishmen with an axe.⁸

Following the disastrous Battle of Poitiers and the treaty of Brétigny through which England obtained Calais and the Southwest territories surrounding Guyenne, unrest and strong opposition burst out in the regions relinquished to the English. The consuls of Cahors, the capital of Quercy, expressed "great distress at losing their *naturel seigneur*, the King of France, and having to accept and serve a unknown *estrange* master." The inhabitants of La Rochelle also petitioned not to be pushed out from the ruling territories of the King of France and placed under the alien rule. However, after receiving the royal order to force them to obey for the sake of the Kingdom, the leaders of the town claimed "nous adourerons les Anglois de levres, mais les cuers ne s'en mouveront ja"(though we acknowledge the English as our lords perfunctorily, our hearts will not be moved).⁹ On the other hand, when the treaty of Brétigny was broken and the war renewed, Limoges, the

6 *The Chronicle of Jean de Venette*, ed. R. A. Newhall(Columbia Univ. Press, 1953), pp. 40-41.

7 *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46.

8 *Ibid.*, pp. 90-93.

9 The Online Froissart(<http://www.hrionline.ac.uk/onlinefroissart>), Besançon 864 fol. 225; P. Wolff, "Les Français du Moyen Age étaient-ils des 'patriotes'?", *L'Histoire*, No. 37(sept. 1981), pp. 52-60.

capital of Limousin under the rule of the Black Prince, joined the French. In August of 1370, the town welcomed and paid homage to Jean, duke of Berry, and the Duke of Bourbon. However, the uprising was crushed by the infuriated Black Prince within a month, and according to Froissart, roughly 3,000 people were killed regardless of their gender and age.¹⁰

In the period after 1420 when allegiances were clearly divided following the conclusion of the treaty of Troyes, resistance movements spread out widely and took place more frequently. According to Claude Gauvard, after the treaty resistance against the Anglo-Burgundian rule took place even in the frontiers of the Kingdom. In fact, it was paradoxical that resistance began in them. For example, the inhabitants of Tournai, a town located in the borders of the Kingdom and the County of Flanders that maintained allegiance to the King of France since the early fourteenth century, realizing that its nobility who was interested in trade routes with Ghent was leaning towards the Burgundians, resisted under the principle: “la ville est au Roi”(the town belongs to the King). At last a revolution in June of 1423 witnessed that craftsmen wrested control under the flags of both the guilds and fleurs-de-lis, and swore allegiance to the King of France, Charles VII.¹¹

However, it was in Normandy under the rule of the Duke of Bedford, regent of France, that the resistance was the strongest. G. Lefevre-Pontalis, more than a century ago, argued that many Norman forests had been strongholds of the ‘Guerre de Patisans’(Partisans' War) in the 1420s, resisting against the English occupation.¹² According to him, the defenders of the ‘idée nationale’(national idea) who banded together

10 The Online Froissart, fols. 330r-332v. See also *Chronique des règnes de Jean II et de Charles V*, éd. R. Delachenal, t. II(1364-1380)(Paris, 1916), p. 45-47; E. Perroy, “Edouard III d'Angleterre et les seigneurs gascons en 1368”, *Etudes d'histoire médiévale*(Paris, 1979). pp. 299-303; J. Favier, *La Guerre de Cent Ans*(Paris, 1980), pp. 314-325.

11 C. Gauvard, “L'opinion publique aux confins des Etats et des Principautés au début du 15e siècle”, *Les principautés au Moyen Age*(Actes du 4e congrès de la Société des historiens médiévistes de l'Enseignement Supérieur, Paris, 1979). pp. 127-152; Id., “Comment l'amour de la France vint aux Français?”, *L'Histoire*, No. 52(janv. 1983), pp. 84-87.

12 L. Lefevre-Pontalis, “La guerre de partisans dans la Haute-Normandie(1424-1429)”, *Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Chartes*, t. 54(1893), pp. 475-521; Id., t. 55(1894), pp. 259-305; t. 56(1895), pp. 433-508; t. 57(1896), pp. 5-54; t. 97(1936), pp. 102-130. See also E. Bourassin, *La France anglaise, 1415-1453*(Paris, 1981), pp. 182-195, 231-255.

for a common cause after having left their families and villages, fought a sort of guerrilla war against the English invaders and the French collaborators. Thus they persisted in “this war without truce and mercy… without hope and despair.”¹³ He regarded as partisans, not only those who were called ‘traistre’(traitors), ‘ennemi et adversaire du roi’(enemy and adversary of the king), ‘criminel de lèse-majesté’(criminal of lèse-majesté) and so on, but also those who were called 'brigand' and someone with similar names—e.g. ‘larron’(thief), ‘guetteur de chemin’(bandit), ‘routier’, ‘pillard’(pillager), ‘meurtrier’(murderer) etc.—in the official records. For him, they were the ‘patriots’ who had refused to take a loyalty oath to the king of England. They included all the social classes from peasants, fishermen, craftsmen, merchants, petty officials to remnants of the French garrisons on the frontier, nobles and clergymen, and had an organization and its rules(e.g. capitaine, formula of oath, code, and etc.).¹⁴

The resistance was not confined to only these ‘maquisards’(underground partisans). But for helps of neighboring sympathizers who offered frequently necessities and information, their existence would not have been possible. Their families and neighbors who remained in the villages brought food and other necessities to appointed places at the risk of their own lives. Some parish priests and foresters gave them news from the outside and secret information of the enemy, and sometimes acted as liaison between the French garrison on the frontier and the partisans in the forest.¹⁵ Such scattered movements sometimes were able to lead to an extensive revolt, as it were a ‘Norman Jacquerie’ in a timely manner as burst out during the battle of Verneuil in 1424 and after the treaty of Arras in 1435.¹⁶

13 L. Lefevre-Pontalis, op. cit., *BEC*, t. 57(1896), p. 484; *BEC*, t. 55(1894), p. 283. According to a research on the geographical origin of the resisters, 125 executed out of 134 whose birthplace are known were born within 50km from the town of their execution. R. Jouet, *La résistance à l'occupation anglaise en Basse-Normandie(1418-1450)*(Caen, 1969). pp. 79-83.

14 L. Lefevre-Pontalis, op. cit., *BEC*, t. 54(1893), pp. 485-494. For the various judicial documents concerning the resistance or brigandage in Normandy during the English occupation, see Paul le Cacheux éd, *Actes de la Chancellerie d'Henri VI concernant la Normandie sous le domination anglaise(1422-1435)*, 2 vols.(Rouen, 1907); *Chronique du Mont-Saint-Michel(1343- 1468)*, éd. S. Luce, 2 vols.(Paris, 1879, 1883), t. I, Pièces juscatives.

15 André Plaisse supports the view that a number of the Normans condemned to death as 'brigands' were the 'maquisards' in constant contact with the French troops in the frontier. A. Plaisse, *La baronnie du Neubourg: Essai d'histoire agraire, économique et sociale*(Paris, 1963), p. 314.

16 L. Lefevre-Pontalis, op. cit., *BEC*, t. 56(1895), p. 489; t. 55(1894), p. 273; R. Jouet, *La résistance à*

The 'patriotic France' portrayed by G. Lefevre-Pontalis, however, was only a simplified and partial image. B. J. H. Rowe who dealt with the same theme on the other side of the Channel, criticized his main argument that all those whom were declared as 'brigands' in the official records or executed as such were partisans of Charles VII.¹⁷ According to her, the existence of 'brigands' was not a new phenomenon following the English invasion, but a constant one, that is, a by-product of prolonged war, disorder and devastation even before 1415. Consequently their motive must not have been political and, in other words, was not originated from hatred of alien occupation and loyalty to French king. For a long time, the forest was often a den of outlaws. At that period when the pillage and destruction by men-at-arms was quite common, much more people ended up becoming brigands after having gone into the woods because of fear for men-at-arms or in order to fight against them.¹⁸ In sum, she argues that the English invasion and occupation "gave brigandage the halo of patriotism."¹⁹

Then, was the resistance of partisans carried out in the Norman forests of the 'France anglaise' nothing but a 'myth'? As we have just discussed, the question is directly related to another question: Who were indeed the 'brigands' frequently mentioned in various sources? But, this question is likely to remain unsolved, because there were no strict legal definitions of the 'brigand' and other similar terms, and no detailed information of them. As R. Jouet has noted, the 'brigand' in judicial records was often identified with the 'rebel', 'traitor' and the 'enemy', that is, the 'armignaz'(armagnac); for instance, Henry V ordered all the subjects under his protection to return to their home within a given period and declared that any offender would be regarded as 'brigans et inimicus'(brigand and our enemy).²⁰ Therefore, we cannot but admit that the term, in all probabilities, might have

l'occupation anglaise... pp. 62-63; *Journal d'un bourgeois de Paris, 1405-1449*, éd. C. Beaune(Paris, 1990), pp. 213-214; *Chronique du Mont-Saint Michel*, t. I, Pièces juscatives, n. 31.

17 B. J. H. Rowe, "John Duke of Bedford and the Norman 'Brigands'", *The English Historical Review*, vol. 47(1932), pp. 583-600. See also C. T. Allmand, *Lancastrian Normandy, 1415-1450: The History of a Medieval Occupation*(Oxford, 1983), pp. 230-238.

18 *Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys contenant le règne de Charles VI de 1380 à 1422*, éd. et trad. L. F. Bellaguet, 6 Vols.(Paris, 1839-1852), t. 4, pp. 456-457.

19 B. J. H. Rowe, "John Duke of Bedford and the Norman 'Brigands'", p. 587.

20 "sub pena et periculo quod si quis eorum ad diem illum in domo sua hujus non inventus,, extra protecionem nostram ponatur et tanquam brigans et inimicus noster tenetur et punatur." Recited in R. Jouet, *La*

referred to different kinds of people: true 'brigands' who came before the English occupation, resistants who were called as 'brigands' by the English, and those who in fact acted as both a brigand and resistant.

It can be inferred from various circumstantial evidences that neither the view identifying most of 'brigands' with partisans nor the view separating the two completely is closer to historical realities. The former view overlooks the fact that the fear of the brigands was quite serious and widespread, although it was often exaggerated in official records.²¹ Peter Lewis describes that "brigandage was far too common all over France for the word to be synonymous with fervent patriotism."²² The word 'brigand(s)' appeared most frequently in the chronicles and judicial documents during the period of the Hundred Years War. For example, Orsay, a fortress near Paris, was crowded with "the 'larrons' more wicked than Saracens"²³; In Normandy, the merchants headed for Lendit had to be escorted by a division of four *lances* and 26 archers; Many lands located near the forests were so dangerous that no income could be gained.²⁴

Nevertheless, this does not mean that the resistant movement was negligible in Normandy. In fact, the occupying power chased the 'brigands' persistently: A considerable prize of 6 livres was offered for a head of 'brigands',²⁵ and an accused of having aided them secretly was threatened with death penalty. These facts suggest that the Norman resistance posed a serious menace to the authorities and it was successful to some extent. But it is hard to say that such a resistance was necessarily motivated by

résistance à l'occupation anglaise... p. 19.

21 N. A. R. Wright, "Pillagers and Brigands in the Hundred Years War", *Journal of Medieval History*, vol. 9(1983), pp. 15-24.

22 P. S. Lewis, *Later Medieval France: The Polity*(New York, 1968), p. 287. Here P. Lewis points out: "Some of the Tuchins in Haut-Auvergne might, because they attacked the English, be styled patriots; but it is only too clear that patriotism was hardly in the minds of the more or less organised bands..." On the revolt of Tuchins, see M. Boudet, *La Jacquerie des Tuchins, 1363-1384*(Paris, 1895).

23 *Journal d'un bourgeois de Paris*, pp. 182-183, 201, 223-224.

24 L. Lefevre-Pontalis, op. cit., *BEC*, t. 55(1894), p. 288; R. Jouet, *La résistance à l'occupation anglaise*... pp. 67, 85-88; A. Plaisse, *La baronnie du Neubourg*, pp. 313-315. See also C. T. Allmand, "The Lancastrian Land Settlement in Normandy, 1417-1450", *Economic History Review*, 2e ser., vol. 21(1968), pp. 461-479; M. K. Jones, "War on the Frontier: the Lancastrian Land Settlement in Eastern Normandy, 1435-1450", *Nottingham Medieval Studies*, vol. 33(1989), pp. 104-131.

25 R. Jouet, *La résistance à l'occupation anglaise*... pp. 46-47.

patriotism. Of course, it is not that such a motive was entirely absent; Patriotism was an undeniable element. The bishop of Lisieux, Thomas Basin, historian of the times of Charles VII, witnessed: “Besides those who pretended to fight for the French camp… there were numerous people who, whether for cowardice or hatred of the English or for desire to take other's property, or for evading the law…, having left their fields and homes, like wild beasts and wolves, lived in the thickest and deepest forests.” After having told the story of a Norman priest who responded to several Englishmen asking how to get rid of such people, that “all the English must leave France and return to England, their home country”, Basin continued to write as follows: “As soon as the English, chased out of Normandy, were forced to return to their country, the country was released from this pest.”²⁶

This statement suggests that the motive of peoples who went into the forests was far from simple. Although the Norman peasants showed hostility to the foreign occupying power, they would have endured its rule anyway if only it had secured stability and peace. But the English domination, in spite of the effort of Henry V and Bedford, failed to root out “moult d'oppressions et molestacions”(much oppression and violence), “pilleries, roberies ou aultres extorcions au povre people”(pillages, robberies and other extortion of the poor),²⁷ and this failure became its fatal weakness. As the English who were incapable of reestablishing the order were looked upon as the invaders who had triggered all the troubles, the popular hatred naturally poured into them—“the odious yoke of the English.”²⁸ According to R. Jouet, “in the majority of cases the resitants took arms *against* the English, before they did *for* the France.”²⁹ Some of the discontented would have gathered around these partisans who must have been only a few in the beginning, or helped them secretly, or else willingly drove themselves into a revolt on such a good chance as when the army of Charles VII, a new hope, was approaching.

More than anything else, it was the prolonged war, disorder, and the incapacity of the

26 Thomas Basin, *Histoire de Charles VII*, 2 vols.(Paris, 1964), t. I, pp. 106–111; P. S. Lewis “La ‘France anglaise’ vue de la ‘France française’”, *La ‘France anglaise’ au Moyen Age*(Actes du 111^e Congrès National des Sociétés Savantes)(Paris, 1988), t. 1, pp. 31–40.

27 R. Jouet, *La résistance à l'occupation anglaise*… pp. 33–37; B. J. H. Rowe, “Discipline in the Norman Garrisons under Bedford, 1422–1435”, *English Historical Review*, vol. 46(1931), pp. 194–208.

28 D. Seward, *Henry V as Warlord*(London, 1987), p. 122.

29 R. Jouet, *La résistance à l'occupation anglaise*… p. 37; A. Plaisse, *La baronnie du Neubourg*, p. 315.

occupying power to end the difficulties that led many people to the forests.³⁰ The peasants—these “pouvres gens et de petit estat”(poor men of humble estate), “simples gens de village”(common villagers) became a driving force of resistance, because they were the primary victims of the chronic disorder and pillage.³¹ Their participation, moreover, were facilitated by their experience of vigilance for the village communities in the prolonged war.³²

III. Collaborating France?

Contrary to the peasants, the nobles would have much to lose by choosing the side of resistance. In fact, there were quite few nobles who joined the resistance of the ‘France anglaise’. The majority of upper nobility holding land directly from the crown for which they were liable for personal military service and magnates the least acceptable to the new regime flocked together in the court of Charles VII, or served in his army.³³

In Normandy, the lords dispossessed because of joining the revolt during the English occupation were not so many.³⁴ On the whole the Norman nobles and the occupying power seemed to maintain relatively amicable relations. In fact, the government of Henry V and Bedford was not oppressive but prudent and generous. They behaved themselves as true French rulers rather than alien governors, and therefore respected the laws and customs of their subjects, including the Norman Charter of 1315 which had stipulated the liberties and privileges of the Duchy.³⁵ For instance, although the position of bailli who mainly took charge of military affairs was reserved for the English, the French officials

30 G. Minois, “La France sous l’occupation anglaise”, *L’Histoire*, No. 150(déc. 1991), p. 26.

31 According to Jouet, out of 165 executed resisters in Normandy, only 7 were from towns and had non-agricultural jobs. R. Jouet, *La résistance à l’occupation anglaise*... pp. 82–83.

32 J. Favier, *La Guerre de Cent Ans*(Paris, 1980), p. 533.

33 C. T. Allmand, *Lancastrian Normandy*, pp. 216–218; A. Plaisse, *La baronnie du Neubourg*, pp. 304–305. D. Seward says: "In all, some 500 fiefs were confiscated from the French in Normandy." D. Seward, *Henry V as Warlord*, p. 123.

34 R. Jouet, *La résistance à l’occupation anglaise*... p. 57.

35 P. Contamine, “The Norman ‘Nation’ and the French ‘Nation’ in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries”, D. B. and A. Curry ed., *England and Normandy in the Middle Ages*, pp. 215–226.

were able to be appointed as vicomte who dealt with civil affairs under bailli. The government secured the continuity of ruling system by restoring the positions of Norman exchequer and the office of sénéchal. Furthermore, Bedford trained in a parliamentary tradition resuscitated the Norman Estates which had never been convened since 1382. Summoning the Estates frequently, he not only asked their consent and cooperation for taxation, but also allowed them to control the resources.³⁶ In this way, he tried to make use of the Estates both as a partner of his government and as a safety-valve for the local notables.

Taking such a way of ruling into consideration, it seems that the Norman nobles had few reasons to resist against the new regime. For them, a remarkable point is that their political choice largely depended on their feudal or personal interests and ties. In other words, patriotism followed their interests and ties. On the one hand, most of them still gave priority to feudal allegiances to their lords rather than showing loyalty to the sovereign. Certainly, many nobles of Burgundy and Picardy kept firm allegiance to the 'Burgundian dynasty' throughout this period. For instance, a follower of the Duke of Burgundy, Charles, seigneur de Longueval who had lost his father and had been wounded himself in the battle of Azincourt, sided with the former enemy after 1419 when the Duke allied with the English.³⁷

On the other hand, the nobles took a strong interest in keeping their own patrimony. For instance, Jean de Roffignac, a loyal dauphinist, kept his family's properties in Limousin, and at the same time he sent his son to take an oath to Henry VI to preserve the family's properties in Nivernais. Likewise, two Châteaouvillain brothers served on opposing sides, and the brother of Gaucher, seigneur of Rouvroy-Saint-Simon, chamberlain of Jean sans Peur remained in the Dauphin's party. In 1427 the properties of Georges de La Trémoille confiscated by the English were given to his brother Jean de La Trémoille.³⁸

The clergy, especially the prelates, were bound both by their cosmopolitan inclination

36 B. J. H. Rowe, "The Estates of Normandy under the Duke of Bedford, 1422-1435", *English Historical Review*, vol. 46(1931), pp. 551-578; C. T. Allmand, *Lancastrian Normandy*, p. 17. For the summary of the different Estates of Normandy during the English occupation, see Charles de Beaurepaire, *Les Etats de Normandie sous la domination anglaise*(Evreux, 1859).

37 L. Lefevre-Pontalis, op. cit., *BEC*, t. 56(1895), pp. 449-450.

38 Ibid., 452-453; P. S. Lewis, *Later Medieval France*, p. 68.

and by material interests. No less than the nobles, they had much to lose by resisting and to gain by conforming. As G. Lefevre-Pontalis and R. Jouet pointed out, although there were a few clergy who communicated secretly with French troops on the frontier, or refused to pray in public for the new ruler, the Norman clergy on the whole preserved their privileges and benefices by conforming to the occupying authorities.³⁹

Moreover, Henry V and Bedford treated favorably this order even more than the nobles; they refrained from replacing Norman beneficiaries by their fellow countrymen.⁴⁰ In order to get the compliance and cooperation of these elites who not only offered competent administrative capabilities but also influenced the public opinion, they made use of the benefices and chances of promotion as their best cards. In fact, many parish clergy accepted the new regime quite early and went so far as to lead their parishioners to swear an oath of fealty. Cases of such a collaboration were even more noticeable among some prelates; while Mont-Saint-Michel held out indomitably against the English, “ironically its abbot, Robert Jollivet, served the enemy in Rouen.”⁴¹

Meanwhile, the case of Pierre Cauchon who had long been branded as a ‘traitor’, shows that there might be more complicated motives behind the ‘collaboration’ of prelates.⁴² It was when the voices of intellectuals anxious about the ‘Great Schism’ were getting bigger in order to call upon accord and reunion of the Church that he was in the university of Paris. When the university decided for the ‘retraction of obedience’ to the Avignon Papacy in 1398, the Duke of Burgundy supported this decision, while the Duke of Orléans took the opposite stance. It was certainly since then that the alliance between the university and the Duke of Burgundy began to establish. The Duke, advocate of reunion of the Church, who obtained the nickname ‘sans Peur’ (the Fearless) in the Crusade of Nicopolis, was able

39 R. Jouet, *La résistance à l'occupation anglaise...*, pp. 73-77; C. Allmand, “The English and the Church in Lancastrian Normandy”, D. B. and A. Curry ed., *England and Normandy in the Middle Ages* (London, 1994), pp. 287-297.

40 B. J. H. Rowe, “The Estates of Normandy...”, p. 561.

41 C. Allmand, “The English and the Church in Lancastrian Normandy”, pp. 287-289.

42 Regarding the life of Cauchon see F. Neveux, *L'évêque Pierre Cauchon* (Paris, 1987); E. Bourassin, *L'évêque Cauchon* (Paris, 1988); P. Wolff, “Faut-il réhabiliter Cauchon?”, *L'Histoire*, No. 16 (oct. 1979), pp. 56-63. And on the trial of Jeanne d'Arc see J. Quicherat éd., *Procès de condamnation et de réhabilitation de Jeanne d'Arc*, 5 vols. (Paris, 1841-1849); Id., *Aperçu nouveaux sur l'histoire de Jeanne d'Arc* (Paris, 1850).

to attract the attention of clergy like Cauchon. After the Duke captured Paris in 1418 and was assassinated by the Dauphin's companions next year, Cauchon set about his conspicuous career as an irrevocable pro-Burgundy and pro-English, eventually destined to preside over the Jeanne d'Arc trial as bishop of Beauvais.

For him, the homeland in reality was overshadowed by his ideal homeland, the Church. The university of Paris that played the leading role along with him in the trial of Jeanne d'Arc, also saw contemporary issues from the viewpoint of the universal Christendom, and of a privileged corporate body. Indeed, the university was one of the most outstanding collaborators and beneficiaries of the new regime. It took the lead in planning the treaty of Troyes in 1420, and readily accepted its outcome, the 'Dual Kingdom'. When young Henry VI entered Paris for his coronation in 1431, Nicolas Midi on behalf of the university made a welcoming speech that gave thanks "to God for the joyous and happy accession of the King" and called him "the father, the patron, and the special protector of the university which is our sovereign lord's eldest daughter (domini nostri regis filia primogenita)."⁴³ The university was able to enjoy the privileges and prosperity owing to such thanks and exalting prayers for the king on every special occasion.⁴⁴

There could be two major motives and purposes of such an opportunistic conduct, as Jacques Vergers argued.⁴⁵ First, the university tried to keep its privileges. It found the most powerful protector in the state power that became increasingly stronger, and it had to compromise with the state to keep its vested interest. Second, the university wanted the peace. When it comes to the matter of war and peace, the university used to side with the doves while disapproving the hawks. Therefore, it reproached the Armagnacs and Jeanne d'Arc, while advocating the treaty of Troyes and favoring the occupying power. But as this power turned out to be incapable of assuring the peace, it ended up turning

43 J. Verger, "The University of Paris at the End of the Hundred Years' War", J. Baldwin & R. Goldthwaite ed., *Universities in Politics: Case Studies from the Late Middle Ages and Early Modern Period* (Baltimore, 1972), pp. 47-78; C. Jourdain, "L'université de Paris à l'époque de la domination anglaise", *Extrait du Bulletin de l'Académie des Inscriptions et belles-lettres* (Paris, 1870), pp. 1-28.

44 When the faculty of canon law accepted four newcomer doctors including two Englishmen in June 1428, the Duke of Bedford came to preside over the banquet. J. Favier, *La Guerre de Cent Ans*, p. 534. See also A. Longnon éd, *Paris pendant la domination anglaise (1420-1436): Documents extraits des registres de la Chancellerie de France* (Paris, 1878), nos. 155, 156.

45 J. Verger, "The University of Paris...", pp. 47-78.

toward Charles VII after the treaty of Arras(1435). Which dynasty would inherit the French throne and territory was less important for the university than how to keep the peace. That was why it had made a proposition to divide the Kingdom just before the treaty of Arras and later suggested ending the war immediately by giving over Normandy and Guyenne to England in the Estates of Orléans in 1439.

Apart from the English incapacity to keep the peace, what prompted the university to turn its back on the English was the establishment of the university of Caen in 1432 by the Duke of Bedford. Against the project, the university of Paris strongly protested on the pretext of worrying about “the dissipation of our study and also the depopulation of this good city.” In fact, a new university in Normandy the natives of which formed a ‘natio’ in the university of Paris would mean heavy losses in recruiting new students and obtaining incomes. Besides, when the French reconquest of Normandy began in those years, the university could not but rely on Charles VII.⁴⁶

As for the conformity and cooperation of Paris, there have been some eyewitnesses such as the anonymous ‘Bourgeois de Paris’. According to him, in February 1423 “all Parisians, that is bourgeois, habitants(ménagers), carters… and even the chambermaids and the nuns took an oath to be *bons et loyaux* to the Duke of Bedford, brother of late Henry, king of England, regent of France, to obey him in anything and anywhere and to harm with all their might Charles who calls himself king of France and all his allies and accomplices.” Whenever the army of Bedford returned after repelling that of Charles, Parisians sang *Te deum laudamus* loudly and made a solemn procession.⁴⁷

Jehan Marcel, maybe a descendent of the famous family of Etienne Marcel, Provost of the Merchants in Paris, was a typical opportunistic businessman who made a fortune by means of active collaboration. Having left Paris to establish himself in Rouen, he offered Bedford *bons et agreables services* such as lending money for military actions, and received considerable favors which enabled him, for example, to acquire some properties “confiscated and forfeited due to the absence and rebellion” and to speculate in salt monopoly.⁴⁸

46 Ibid., pp. 57, 71; C. T. Allmand, *Lancastrian Normandy*, pp. 108-111; J. Favier, *La Guerre de Cent Ans*, p. 535.

47 *Journal d'un bourgeois de Paris*, pp. 198, 216.

48 M. Mollat, “Un 'collaborateur' au temps de la guerre de Cent Ans: Jehan Marcel, changeur à Rouen”,

However, the most of the Parisian bourgeois, although their interests varied with individuals and groups, must have accepted the Anglo-Burgundian regime because they strongly aspired to attain the peace just like the university of Paris. The Duke of Burgundy gained popularity among them, not only as he was regarded as an advocate of the popular desire for governmental and fiscal reform by the time of the Cabochien revolt in 1413, but also because the connection with trading towns in Flanders, a part of his territories, was very important to wealthier merchants in particular.⁴⁹ But the most important issue to the bourgeois was the peace that above all made their economic activities possible. Any party's rule, even if it was the English rule, would have been much better than the war. By the time of the royal entry of Henry VI into Paris in 1431, with various performances along the parade route the Parisians would have not welcome just the coronation of the young king itself but the subsequent peace and its concomitant reopening of markets and businesses.⁵⁰ But as the peace they longed for became far off, the public sentiment also began to move from the occupying power to the *naturel siegneur* Charles VII. From the treaty of Arras onwards, in the eyes of the anonymous 'Bourgeois de Paris', the Armagnacs appeared as the 'French', and the English as those who pillaged.⁵¹

Conclusion

Judging from what I have discussed, it can be said that the view regarding the resistance and collaboration during the late period of Hundred Year's War as a sign of national consciousness or patriotism is somewhat anachronistic. The resistance during the period was not compared with that of 1940s at all.

First of all, although some hatred or patriotic motives were not altogether absent, the resistance was essentially a reaction to pillages and destructions by all kinds of troops, so it would probably have aimed at all pillagers rather than Englishmen in particular. It is

Annales ESC t. 1(1946), pp. 36-42.

49 J. Favier, *Paris: Deux mille ans d'histoire*(Paris, 1997), pp. 787-788.

50 Regarding the Henry VI's entry into Paris see "Document relatif à l'entrée du roi d'Angleterre Henri VI à Paris en 1431", *Revue des études historiques*, nouv. sér. t. 75(1909), pp. 411-415.

51 *Journal d'un bourgeois de Paris*, pp. 344-345.

necessary to keep in mind Jean Favier's remark that since the reign of Charles V French peoples had tended to consider unemployed companies and vagrant men of arms indiscriminately as Englishmen.⁵² Meanwhile, we also need to keep in mind that the desire for peace might have led to the conformity and cooperation with the occupying power, and that a cold and hostile attitude began to spring up among the people as their expectation turned into disillusionment. As the following medieval proverb tells, "Qui tient la paix, il tient le pays"(He who keeps the peace, will take the country).⁵³

Another point to keep in mind is that, in all probabilities, for the habitants of the 'France anglaise', the occupation was not so heavy. Not to speak of the habitants of the 'France bourguignonne', those in Paris also would have thought that they were not under the English rule but the rule of Duke of Burgundy, a French prince. So, in their eyes the dauphinists called 'Armagnacs' appeared to be 'rebels'.⁵⁴ In fact, for the habitants of Paris, the conflict between the Armagnacs and the Burgundians was the more important matter of concern rather than the English-French war. The government of Henry V and Bedford took advantage of such a public opinion of Parisians which was for the Burgundians and against the Armagnacs. Thus, Paris was not able to become a real capital of the second kingdom for the English.⁵⁵

Still, there were other reasons why the occupation was not so heavy for the habitants of the 'France anglaise'. Firstly, the government of Duke of Bedford, on the whole, was not severe but prudent and moderate. Furthermore, the number (about hundreds) of English residents in Paris was too small to give an impression of being occupied.⁵⁶ The

52 J. Favier, *La Guerre de Cent Ans*, p. 465.

53 P. S. Lewis "La 'France anglaise' vue de la 'France française'", p. 33.

54 G. L. Thompson, *Paris and Its People under English Rule: The Anglo-Burgundian Regime 1420-1436*(Oxford, 1991), pp. 208-211. In 1429 the habitants of Orléans confronted by the prolonged siege once deliberated their surrender to the English on the condition that the town was placed under the protection of the Duke of Burgundy. A. Leguai, "La 'France bourguignonne' dans le conflit entre la 'France française' et la 'France anglaise'(1420-1435)", *La 'France anglaise' au Moyen Age*, pp. 41-52(esp. p. 48).

55 G. L. Thompson, "Le régime anglo-bourguignon à Paris: facteurs idéologiques", *La 'France anglaise' au Moyen Age*, pp. 53-60.

56 According to G. L. Thompson, the Bastille was the only place in Paris regularly garrisoned by Englishmen during the period of 1420-36, but "Falstof's indenture of 1421 stipulated that a force of twenty men-at-arms and sixty archers, all mounted, for the guard of the Bastille." G. L. Thompson, *Paris and Its*

matrimonial relationship among the ruling families of 'three Frances' also might have weakened such an impression.⁵⁷ Before anything else, Henry VI, the first king of the 'Dual Kingdom' did not pretend to contend against the Valois unlike Edward III who contended against them a century earlier, but was a legitimate successor to the French throne appointed by his grandfather, Charles VI. Therefore, for the masters of the university of Paris, the treaty of Troyes uniting the two Kingdoms in conflict under a single monarch seemed to be an excellent solution for the peace.⁵⁸

In the same context, the history of close relations of the two Kingdoms needs to be remembered. Considering the roots of the Norman and the Plantagenet dynasties, and the entangled history of territorial disputes or matrimonial alliances, the unification of the two Kingdoms was nothing but that of two thrones. As the 'revisionist' view of English historians suggested, the 'Dual Monarchy' was so probable a solution at that time,⁵⁹ and for a great part of French people the war of the two dynasties was anything but that between the good and the evil. Anyway, for the two christian kings, so called 'thaumaturges', didn't it seem that God stood by the kings of England by giving them a series of victories? It is no wonder that some French intellectuals thought that the English government might be more desirable than that of the Valois.⁶⁰ But, it can be said that although the national sentiment was not so strong then enough to make such an idea of 'Dual Monarchy' unimaginable, nevertheless it was strong enough to make its realization impossible ultimately.

Then, did the French in the early fifteenth century indeed have a national sentiment, or was they quite patriotic? According to an analysis in 1445 of Jean Juvenel des Ursins who became bishop of Beauvais after Pierre Cauchon and later presided over the

People..., pp. 93-94.

57 The Duke of Bedford and his opponents Richemont, constable of France, and Charles de Bourbon, count of Clermont were all the brothers-in-law of Philippe le Bon, Duke of Bourgogne. J. Favier, *La Guerre de Cent Ans*, p. 474.

58 J. Verger, "The University of Paris...", p. 66.

59 On the 'revisionist' view see P. Contamine, "La 'France anglaise' au XVe siècle: Mythe ou réalité", *La France anglaise au Moyen Age*, pp. 17-29; Id., "De Guillaume le Conquérant à Jeanne d'Arc: la formation des Etats nationaux", Fr. Bédarida, Fr. Crouzet, D. Johnson éd., *De Guillaume le conquérant au Marché commun*(Paris, 1979), pp. 23-34.

60 C. T. Allmand, *La guerre de Cent Ans*, p. 203.

reinstatement trial of Jeanne d'Arc, there was three kinds of peoples in the last war. "Some... have always been in the king's party without flinching, and have abandoned their lands and lordships and one can properly call them good and loyal Frenchmen." Others who never liked the English, though in some incidents helping them, took the side of monsieur of Burgundy..., and since the reconciliation with the king they have shown their good and loyal hearts towards the king. Finally, "others... have shown themselves in their hearts and otherwise true and perfect Englishmen, more almost than the English natives ... And one must still believe that their hearts and loyalties are with the enemy."⁶¹ To sum up, Jean Juvenel made a judgement on whether peoples are *bons et loyaulx francois* or not by their loyalty to the king.

Based on what I have observed in the viewpoint of 'resistance' and 'collaboration' in the 'France anglaise', it can be said that such a loyalty showed diverse aspects according to one's social order or status. In general, it was easier to be split in the test for the vested groups with privileges, corporations and feudal ties such as members of aristocracy, clergy, university of Paris and so on. On the other hand, the lower peoples for whom a political decision was not demanded and very little interests depended upon that decision, might have been freed from such a test and split. Jeanne d'Arc who was a common peasant maid in frontier area, the habitants of Paris who insulted her as lewd, the anonymous 'Bourgeois de Paris' who wrote such a scene,⁶² the Burgundians who took her to court, and bishop Cauchon and masters of the university of Paris who condemned her as a heretic... The affair of Jeanne d'Arc seems to imply such a dramatic contrast.

61 *Ecrits politiques de Juvénal des Ursins*, éd. P. S. Lewis, 3 vols(Paris, 1978-1985), t. 1, pp. 455-456; P. S. Lewis, *Later Medieval France*, pp. 68-69.

62 *Journal d'un bourgeois de Paris*, pp. 266.